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Christopher LiLLington-Martin – MiChaeL edward stewart 
turning traitor: shifting LoyaLties in proCopius’ Gothic Wars
In 548 CE, the East Roman garrison protecting Rome from the resurgent 
Goths murdered their commander, Konon, evidently because he had deprived 
them of their proper pay and provisions1. According to the sixth-century 
East Roman historian of these campaigns, Procopius, the soldiers then sent 
some priests as their envoys to the emperor Justinian in Constantinople with 
a warning that, if they were not exonerated for the murder and given all the 
back pay owed to them, they would switch sides to the Goths. Suggesting the 
desperate military situation faced by Justinian’s forces in Italy at the time, 
Procopius records that Justinian complied to the soldiers’ demands2. That 
soldiers’ grievances against their commanding officers might escalate to 
homicide is not too shocking since we have other examples from antiquity of 
similar murders of commanding officers by troops when they were not paid 
or properly fed3. Blackmailing the emperor 850 miles away in Constantinople 
to forgive them for their “crime” and having him accept their offer was 
rarer. It contradicts typical modern portraits of Justinian as an inflexible 
1. Although Procopius used the term “Byzantine” when referring to someone from the 
city of Constantinople, or at times “Greek”, to describe the East Romans, the historian’s 
preferred term was “Roman”. We therefore employ “East Roman” and “Roman” to describe 
Justinian’s soldiers.
2. Procopius, Bella, ed. J. haury – g. wirth, v. 1-2, Leipzig 1963 [hereafter cited as 
Procopius, Wars, ed. haury – wirth], 7.30.7-8, v. 2, 427. Cf. Procopius, Wars, ed. – transl. H. 
B. dewing, LCL 81 (5 vols.) Cambridge Mass. 1914-1940.
3. A. D. Lee, Food Supply and Military Mutiny in the Late Roman Empire, Journal 
of Late Antiquity [hereafter: JLA] 12 (2019), 277-297.
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and all-powerful despot4. Some modern readers might also find Procopius’ 
ambivalence towards the Roman garrison’s actions unexpected. Though it 
was a trademark of ancient historians to maintain neutrality and tell both 
sides of the story, by examining instances of desertion and treason in Books 
5 to 8 in the Wars, this article proposes that such an even-handed posture 
reveals Procopius’ generally benign opinion about soldiers who deserted. 
This forgiving attitude stood in stark contrast to the harsh penalties in the 
Roman law provisions concerning soldiers who deserted to the enemy5. 
When discussing military loyalties, Procopius recognised that soldiers 
would naturally switch sides if the expected rewards were provided by the 
enemy, or, in certain circumstances, if the opponent’s commander was a 
charismatic and/or fair leader like the Goth Totila or the Roman Belisarius. 
As Shane Bjornlie has recently observed, “Procopius’ history is replete 
with episodes in which Goths, Italians and eastern imperial representatives 
change allegiance during the course of the war”6. Moreover, parties on both 
sides could desert to one side and then desert back to the other side. Procopius 
describes an episode where a young East Roman soldier Martinianos 
feigns desertion to the Goths. Earning the trust of the Gothic king Totila, 
Martinianos then convinces fifteen former Roman deserters to join a plot 
to betray the key Gothic town of Spoleto to the Romans. The plot succeeds, 
and the deserters re-joined Belisarius’ army7. 
This is not to say that Procopius always perceived desertions by Roman 
soldiers as honourable. At the close of the Wars (8.33. 10-12), Procopius 
describes how a detachment of the Roman army is sent to capture a Gothic 
garrison at Perugia commanded by two Roman deserters, Meligedios 
4. For negative assessments of Justinian, see T. honoré, Tribonian, London, 1978, 28-
30; P. heather, Rome Resurgent: War and Empire in the Age of Justinian, oxford 2018, 
203. For Justinian’s more conciliatory side, see D. parneLL, Justinian’s Clemency and God’s 
Clemency, ΒυζΣύμμ 30 (2020), 11-30. 
5. on the recommendation of the death penalty for acts of treason and/or desertion in 
the Justinianic law codes, see A. paoLo, Treason and Crimes against the Emperor and State 
in the Byzantine Juridical Compilations, Teoria e storia del diritto privato 8 (2015), 1-27, 
here 8-9.
6. M.S. BjornLie, Politics and Tradition Between Rome, Ravenna and Constantinople: 
A Study of Cassiodorus and the Variae, 527-554, Cambridge 2013, 148.
7. Procopius, Wars, 7.23.1-7, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 399-400.
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and Ulifus. According to Procopius, when Ulifus had deserted he had 
“treacherously” murdered his commander, Kyprianos. on the one hand, 
when the Romans arrived at Perugia, Ulifus refused to surrender, which 
leads to his death in the subsequent battle–Procopius then tellingly declares 
that Ulifus’ demise was a direct “retribution from god” (τίσις ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ 
δηλονότι περιπεσοῦσα)8. on the other hand, Meligedios –who, Procopius 
explains had originally wanted to deliver the fortress to the Romans– and 
was forced to fight against his will, ends up surrendering honourably, and 
was likely reintegrated back into Narses’ army.
 We might then ask what can these and other examples of “traitorous” 
behaviours and such desertions by both sides tell us about dissent in the 
age of Justinian9? In this article we submit that these and other acts of 
dissidence by soldiers suggest that units of Justinian’s army –at least during 
the western wars– had some level of freedom of speech and action that 
sometimes allowed them to dictate terms to either their commander or to 
the central government in Constantinople. So too may Gothic resistance, in 
Italy, be interpreted as an act of nonconformity by a polity and/or individuals 
who rejected imperial visions of them as barbarian others, with no rightful 
claim over Italy. In addition, this article seeks to demonstrate the necessity 
of appreciating Procopius’ literary aims, which are often just as critical to 
understand as his historical purpose. So, rather than use Procopius’ writing 
largely as a “database” for the investigation, as much previous scholarship 
on the issue of desertions and treason in the Gothic war has done, this paper 
seeks to demonstrate how Procopius deploys his many vignettes on these 
topics as a literary tool by which to serve his larger didactic purpose10.
Finally, one must differentiate between large scale mutinies and coups, 
such as the ones that afflicted Justinian’s army in North Africa in the 
530s and 540s (involving upwards of 8,000 soldiers) with the smaller scale 
defections or threatened desertions (like that of the East Roman garrisons in 
Italy) of individual soldiers and units that plagued the imperial and Gothic 
8. Procopius, Wars, 8.33. 10-11, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 663. 
9. Procopius’ preferred term for “betrayal or treason” was the Greek word προδοσία 
and for a “betrayer” or “traitor” the Greek noun προδότης. The historian’s preferred term 
for a “deserter” was αὐτόμολος. 
10. See, e.g., P. AMory, People and Identity in Ostrogothic Italy, 489-554, Cambridge 
1997; heather, Rome Resurgent, 2018.
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armies throughout the two decades of Justinian’s struggle to eradicate 
Gothic resistance in Italy11. Procopius details the Roman high-command’s 
rivalries and near constant bickering throughout the 540s, as well as 
Belisarius’ frustration with what Procopius describes as a lack of support 
from the central government in Constantinople (without any allowance 
for the effects of the plague from 542)12. However, there was never a large-
scale rebellion in mainland Italy, as there had been in Africa at Easter 
536, which led to an uprising in Sicily that Spring13.
11. For the differing political aims of the rebels in North Africa, see J. Conant, Staying 
Roman: Conquest and Identity in Africa and the Mediterranean, 439-700, Cambridge 
2012, 216, who contends reasonably that Stotzas in 536 and the former Dux Numidiae, 
Gontharis in 545, had each hoped to claim the imperial title. A. MerriLLs, Contested 
Identities in Byzantine North Africa: in The Routledge Handbook of Identity in Byzantium, 
ed. D. parneLL – M. e. stewart – C. whateLy, London & New York (forthcoming), however, 
suggests that in the case of Stozas, “his aspirations may have been more local”.
12.The 540s had seen deadly waves of a variant of bubonic plague [Yersinia pestis] 
devastate every corner of the empire–Justinian, in fact, had nearly succumbed to the 
sickness during the first and most virulent wave in 542. K. harper (The Fate of Rome: 
Climate, Disease, and the End of Empire, Princeton 2017) posits that the plague led to the 
East Roman population declining by as much as half. See, however, the caveats in K. sessa, 
The New Environmental Fall of Rome: A Methodological Consideration, JLA 12 (2019), 
211-255, here 235-236. Cf. L. MordeChai – M. eisenBerg, Rejecting Catastrophe: The Case of 
the Justinianic Plague, Past and Present 244 (2019), 3-50.
13. For the web of social networks amongst Justinian’s officer corps, see D. A. 
parneLL, Justinian’s Men. Careers and Relationships of Byzantine Army Officers, 518-
610, New York 2017. on Justinian’s relationship with the military, see C. Koehn, Justinian 
und die Armee des frühen Byzanz, Berlin, 2018. on Justinian’s reign more generally 
see J. Moorhead, Justinian, London 1994; M. Meier, Das andere Zeitalter Justinians. 
Kontingenzerfahrung und Kontingenzbewaltigung im 6. Jahrhundert n. Ch., Goettingen 
2003; o. MazaL, Justinian I. und seine Zeit. Geschichte und Kultur des byzantinischen 
Reiches im 6. Jahrhundert, Köln – Weimar – Wien 2001; T. C. Lounghis, Ιουστινιανός 
Πέτρος Σαββάτιος, Τhessalonica 2005.
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Figure 1. Principal cities and areas discussed (©Lillington-Martin).
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To THE VICToR THE SPoILS
Momentum is key to any military campaign’s success and it was clearly 
on the imperial army’s side when it landed in southern Italy in mid-536. 
Belisarius was fresh from a series of spectacular victories against the 
Vandals in North Africa in 533-4 and over the Goths in Sicily in 535, 
when he arrived to mainland Italy, so it must have seemed to many native 
Italians, in a politically divided ostrogothic Italy, that the total collapse of 
Gothic rule was at hand. Hence, it is not surprising that in the early days 
of the Italian campaign, Procopius and other contemporary sources record 
numerous instances whereby those considered Italians or Romans and those 
labelled Goths chose to join Belisarius’ army rather than stand and fight14. 
Part of the reason for the ease with which a Goth might desert to the Romans 
and vice versa was the relative social commonalities between the two sides. 
As Guy Halsall remarks, “The similarities between the armies certainly 
facilitated the changing of sides. Soldiers in the opposing forces could be 
barely distinguishable from each other”15. That might be an exaggeration, 
given the distinct fighting styles of spear-armed Gothic cavalry and bow-
armed Roman cavalry, but they had a great deal in common regarding most 
equipment. Indeed, these defections by both sides have attracted a great deal 
of attention from recent scholars, especially those interested in questions of 
identity concerning those within Justinian’s heterogeneous army and those 
described by contemporary sources like Procopius as Italians/Romans and 
Goths/barbarians16. Though it is vital to consider the ways the Wars provides 
a simplified binarism of an ostrogothic Italy divided neatly into Gothic and 
Italian sides, Procopius, who accompanied Belisarius’ army during the early 
years of the war and witnessed many of the events he describes, offers an 
14. For Belisarius’ thrust into Italy and Theodahad’s failed attempts to counter, see M. 
VitieLLo, Theodahad, A Platonic King at the Collapse of Ostrogothic Italy, Toronto 2014, 
148-155; for a more positive assessment of Theodahad’s response, C. LiLLington-Martin, 
Is the charge that “Theodahad did nothing” to defend Gothic Italy a fair assessment of the 
military campaigns of 535-6?, Unpublished MSt dissertation. Univ. of oxford 2012: www.
academia.edu/1786911/Theodahad_King_of_the_Goths_and_Italians_534 536._Ac_Edu.
15. G. haLsaLL, The ostrogothic Military: in A Companion to Ostrogothic Italy, ed. J. 
arnoLd – M. s. BjornLie – K. sessa, Leiden 2016, 173-199, here, 193.
16. aMory, People and Identity; BjornLie, Politics and Tradition; haLsaLL, ostrogothic 
Military.
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unquestionably rich source with which to investigate instances of desertion 
and treason during the two-decade long war17. 
During the first six months of Belisarius’ Italian campaign, however, 
defections were largely one-way traffic with Italians and Goths fleeing in 
droves to the East Romans. When Belisarius had swiftly conquered Sicily 
in 53518, Procopius records (Wars 5.5. 12-17) that the imperial army took 
Catania, Syracuse and the other cities by surrender and was only resisted 
briefly by a Gothic garrison in Palermo, which suggests that Theodahad had 
ordered minimal defensive preparations such as garrisons, given that Gothic 
population settlements were concentrated north of Rome19. This conquest 
culminated in a rapturous reception from the native Sicilians at Syracuse 
in late December, upon Belisarius’ “triumph” in Syracuse (31st December 
535), but this may have been induced by his “throwing golden coins to all” 
καὶ νόμισμα χρυσοῦ ρίπτων ἅπασιν (Wars 5.5. 18-19). Marcellinus follows 
Procopius and only Jordanes names a Gothic commander, Sinderith20. 
Nevertheless, the Goths on the Italian mainland had not given up hope. 
Seeking to thwart Belisarius’ expected landing of his army on the Italian 
peninsula in Bruttium, at the Straits of Messina, the king of the Goths 
and Italians, Theodahad (r. 534-536), had sent his son-in-law Ebremud/
Ebrimuth with an army of an unspecified size. The date this army arrived in 
Bruttium is uncertain. A letter from Cassiodorus (Variae 12.5.3) indicates 
that a Gothic army (probably Ebremud’s) had been in the area for some 
time, annoying the locals by ravaging their lands for supplies; recent 
17. For Procopius’ service and duties under Belisarius, see now C. LiLLington-Martin, 
Procopius, πάρεδρος / quaestor, Codex Justinianus, I.27 and Belisarius’ strategy in the 
Mediterranean: in: C. LiLLington-Martin – e. turquois, Procopius of Caesarea: Literary and 
Historical Interpretations, London 2018, 157-185.
18. For the Italians’ attitudes towards the Goths and the East Romans, see M.E. 
stewart, The Danger of the Soft Life: Manly and Unmanly Romans in Procopius’s Gothic 
War, JLA 10.2 (2017), 473-502.
19. P. Hεατηεr, The Goths, oxford 1998, 238, Fig. 8.1. Cf. G. P. BrogioLo, Dwelling 
and Settlements in Gothic Italy: in The Ostrogoths. From the migration period to the sixth 
century. An Ethnographic Perspective, ed. S. J. Barnish – f. Marazzi, Woodbridge – UK, 
Rochester – USA 2007, 113-133.
20. Jordanes, Getica 60.308, Romana 369, ed. Th. M. MoMMsen, MGH, AA, 5/1, Berlin 
1882 [repr. 1961]; Marcellinus, Chron. s.a. 535, ed., trans. & comm. B. CroKe [ByzAus7], 
Sydney 1995.
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scholarship links this poor behaviour with the unwillingness of the locals 
to resist Belisarius’ invasion21. The Gothic troops were not much better at 
resistance. Rather than contesting Belisarius’ landing, shortly after the East 
Roman forces set their first feet on shore, Ebremud surrendered, apparently 
cowed by the might of Belisarius’ army, thus setting an example of treachery. 
A contemporary of Procopius, Jordanes, provides the best details of the 
betrayal, recording Nec mora deterioratam causam cernens suorum ad partes 
victoris paucis et fidelissimis famulis consciis movit, ultroque se Belesarii 
pedes advolvens Romani regni optat servire principibus. (“He (Ebremud) 
soon saw that his side was the weaker. Coming over with a few close and 
faithful followers to the side of the victor and willingly casting himself at 
the feet of Belisarius, he decided to serve the rulers of the Roman Empire”)22. 
Procopius reports that once the Goth surrendered, he accepted a move to 
Constantinople, whereupon Justinian granted him the rank of patrician 
and rewarded him with gifts and money23. This last detail should raise our 
suspicions that the East Romans had had Ebremud’s ear for some time prior 
to the landing–all the more likely since his father-in-law Theodahad had 
spent much of 535 and early 536 negotiating a peaceful transition of power. 
According to Procopius, once Sicily fell to Belisarius, Theodahad wanted to 
accept Justinian’s offer to abdicate and cede his kingdom to Justinian and 
afterwards bask in a luxurious retirement in Constantinople24. However, 
before a diplomatic agreement could be reached, two events intervened that, 
at least in the short term, turned the tables to the Goths’ favour. In late 
535 or early 536 the Goths earned a hard-fought victory over an army sent 
by Justinian to Dalmatia and killed its commander Mundus (Wars 5.7). 
This victory was followed by Stotzas’ rebellion in North Africa just before 
Easter 536, which forced Belisarius to leave Sicily and rush to Carthage 
to suppress the mutiny, for which Procopius offers three main causes25. 
21. VitieLLo, Theodahad, 149.
22. Jordanes, Getica 60.30-9 (trans. Mierow, 100).
23. Procopius, Wars, 5.8. 1-3, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 39. Cf. Marcellinus, Chron s.a. 
536, where the author describes Ebremud’s deserting and then fleeing to Belisarius in Sicily.
24. For Justinian’s similar offer to Amalasuintha to abdicate in his favour, see M. 
VitieLLo, Amalasuintha: The Transformation of Queenship in the Post-Roman World, 
Philadelphia 2017.
25. 1. Some Roman “soldiers” demand to retain land which had belonged to their Arian 
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Belisarius’ departure, in turn, led to an uprising amongst the imperial army 
in Sicily26, which provided Theodahad with a window of opportunity to 
steel his nerves, regroup and prepare his defences to resist the impending 
invasion27. 
It is possible that Theodahad provoked the Roman mutiny in Sicily, 
when Belisarius was dealing with the one in Carthage, partly because 
Procopius, the only source to mention it, is entirely silent about the reasons 
for its occurrence, even though he offers three reasons to explain the North 
African mutiny. Even though Procopius naturally knew more about the 
African mutiny, since he was present in Carthage, he could easily have 
ascertained and provided reasons for the cause of the Sicilian mutiny. The 
porosity of Mediterranean lines of communication means it must have been 
at least feasible for Theodahad to have directed agents in the area. He will 
have heard, from 534 onwards, possibly through Arian priests, of the Arian 
grievances, and may possibly have incited Arians in Africa from at least 
535 when motivated by Belisarius’ invasion of Sicily. Had Belisarius been 
less successful at Membresa, or on his return to Sicily (Procopius is also 
silent about how Belisarius quelled the mutiny there), the invasion of Italy 
would have been further delayed, if not postponed. If we were to conclude 
that the reasons Procopius provides for the African mutiny are sufficient 
without any involvement from Theodahad, we can equally suspect that, by 
not providing any explanation for the Sicilian mutiny, Procopius may have 
avoided recording inconvenient truths. Even if Theodahad played no role in 
the insurrection in Sicily, what we do know is that these mutinies gave him 
more time to prepare his defence of mainland Italy.
Despite Theodahad’s volte-face, his close relatives like Ebremud 
probably knew of the Gothic king’s earlier plan to cede Italy to Justinian, 
Vandal wives (Wars, 4.3.24, 4.3, 14. 8-10 and 15.47). 2. Justinian’s discriminatory religious 
policy against the 1,000 “Arian” soldiers in his army (Wars, 4.14. 15, 4.15. 17-20). 3. 400 
Arian Vandal prisoners of war, who had been assigned to cavalry squadrons, mutinied en 
route from Constantinople, at Lesbos. on arrival, they emboldened the Roman mutineers in 
Carthage (Wars 4.15. 17-20).
26. Procopius, Wars, 4.15. 48-49, ed. haury – wirth, v. 1, 495.
27. Procopius, Wars, 4. 14-15, ed. haury – wirth, v. 1, 482-496; Jordanes, Romana 
369–370; Marcellinus, Chron. s.a. 535. 
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and therefore they may have been working on an escape plan for themselves28. 
Hence, it is possible that Ebremud and his inner-circle’s desertion was not 
as impulsive an act as the East Roman sources would want us to believe, but 
rather the result of on-going negotiations. Whatever the truth of the matter, 
it could not have helped Theodahad’s cause. Jordanes (Getica 60.309) indeed 
claims that Ebremud’s desertion raised the suspicions of the jittery Gothic 
elites, who may well have heard of Theodahad’s earlier negotiations with 
Justinian. 
Procopius also describes the propensity for the “locals” in southern 
Italy to allow Belisarius’ army to establish an Italian foothold unhindered. 
Procopius indicates that the natives’ reluctance to resist stemmed from two 
primary factors: first, the towns since ancient times lacked walls and thus 
were indefensible, and, second, because of what Procopius describes as their 
natural hostility toward the Goths, and their particular dissatisfaction with 
the current regime29.
 
FIRST SIEGE oF NAPLES
With Sicily and southern Italy largely pacified, Belisarius and his army 
and navy then slowly advanced on Naples30. At the well-fortified Naples, 
for the first time since arriving to Italy, the imperial forces ran into some 
stubborn resistance from both the Neapolitans and a significant detachment 
of Gothic soldiers. on learning of Ebremud’s desertion, Theodahad’s next 
order to defend Italy had been to garrison Naples. As with his first line 
of defence with the Roman senate, Procopius indicates that Theodahad 
discouraged the Gothic troops from ideas of defection by holding their 
families hostage31. Making such a claim against Theodahad may have 
furthered Procopius’ literary purpose by implying a degree of desperation 
in his orders and a faltering will to resist by Gothic armed forces. That this 
is likely, is supported by his subsequent report that the Gothic garrison 
28. AMory, People and Identity, 373. 
29. Procopius, Wars, 5.8.1-3, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 39.
30. For the possibility that the imperial army may have been slowed down by limited 
cooperation from Italians, concerned for their own sustenance, which created more time for 
Theodahad to prepare for the defence of Naples, see C. LiLLington-Martin, Is the charge... 
[as in n. 14].
31. Procopius, Wars, 5.8.8, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 40.
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“was” ready to allow Belisarius to enter the city if the Neapolitans decided 
so, which would then mean that they were seemingly forgetting the fate 
of their wives and children in the hands of Theodahad32. Even if true, this 
measure by Theodahad may not be as drastic as Procopius tries to make 
it. Judging by the rest of Procopius’ history, it was common practice for 
both the Goths and the East Romans to hold soldiers’ and civilians’ relatives 
hostage as a means to ensure loyalty, or at least cooperation33. Moreover, 
Procopius paints a picture of a feeble and servile native Italian population 
torn between loyalty to their “fellow” Romans from Constantinople and 
their present “masters” the Goths34, often forming garrisons, especially 
south of Rome. When Procopius crafts a series of paired speeches amongst 
the Neapolitan aristocrats and between Belisarius and a Neapolitan envoy, 
Stephanus, he relies heavily on rhetorical notions of freedom, identity, and 
the links between loyalty, desertion, and treason. Belisarius opens by offering 
a carrot in his first speech to Stephanus, given before hostilities open. He 
promises the Neapolitans financial rewards as well as their freedom. To 
prove his noble intentions, Belisarius relates the happiness of the Sicilians, 
οἶς δηλαδὴ τετύχηκεν ἔναγχος βαρβάρων τυράννων τὴν Ἰουστινιανοῦ 
βασιλείαν ἀλλαξαμένοις, ἐλευθέροις τε εἶναι καὶ ἀπαθέσι δυσκόλων 
ἁπάντων (“who had exchanged their barbarian tyrants for the imperial 
authority of Justinian, and as a result were not only free but untroubled 
by any difficulty”)35. Procopius explains that Stephanus and the majority 
of the delegation were then prepared to accept Belisarius’ offer, but when 
they returned to the city, two Neapolitan nobles, Pastor and Alclepiodotus, 
objected and demanded to address the people before any final decision was 
made (Wars 5.8. 29-40). Themes of loyalty, betrayal, and desertion again 
32. Procopius, Wars, 5.8.28, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 43. This reference is from M. 
Cristini (Pers. Comms).
33. See, e.g., Procopius, Wars, 5.26.1-3, 7.23.1-7, 8.34.7 and 8.34.9-14, ed. haury –wirth, 
v.2, 127-128, 399-400, 667, 668. 
34. stewart, Danger of the Soft Life, 491-492.
35. Similar sentiments are found in Agathias, Histories, preface, 1-18, ed. R. KeydeLL, 
Agathiae Myrinaei Historiarum libri Quinque [CFHB 2], Berlin 1967, 30; John Lydus, De 
mag. 3.55. Procopius inverts this topos in his unpublished Secret History, 6.24-25, 18.30, 
ed. haury – wirth, Procopius Historia Arcana, Leipzig 1963, 42, 116-117 [=ed. trans. H.B. 
dewing (LCL 290), Cambridge Mass. 1935]. 
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take centre stage. Before a packed house of Goths and Neapolitans, the two 
polished orators berated Stephanus’ faction for their eagerness to “betray 
[καταπροδιδόναι]” Naples to Belisarius. They then warn the audience of 
poor consequences whether the Goths or Belisarius emerged victorious: ἢν 
γὰρ τῷ πολέμῳ Γότθοι τῶν δυσμενῶν περιέσονται, ὡς πολεμίους ὑμᾶς 
καὶ τὰ δεινότατα σφᾶς αὐτοὺς εἰργασμένους κολάσουσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκῃ 
βιαζόμενοι, ἀλλὰ γνώμῃ ἐθελοκακοῦντες ἐς τὴν προδοσίαν καθίστασθε. 
ὥστε καὶ Βελισαρίῳ κρατήσαντι τῶν πολεμίων ἴσως ἄπιστοί τε 
φανούμεθα καὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων προδόται, καὶ ἅτε δραπέται γεγενημένοι, 
ἐς πάντα τὸν αἰῶνα φρουρὰν πρὸς βασιλέως κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕξομεν.
(“If the Goths defeat their adversaries in war, they will punish you as 
enemies who did them the vilest wrong. For you are committing treason, not 
from necessity, but out of deliberate cowardice. So that even to Belisarius, 
if he overcomes his enemies, we will appear faithless and as betrayers of our 
rulers, having shown ourselves runaways, we will in all likelihood have a 
garrison set over us permanently by the emperor”)36.
Because of this— and other arguments based on similar appeals to 
the Neapolitans’ debt of loyalty to the Goths, as well as the sentiment that 
Belisarius should not be attacking them, but rather Theodahad in Rome— the 
Neapolitans chose to join the Goths in resisting Belisarius’ siege. Protected 
on one side by the sea, on the other by rough terrain, and the other points by 
Naples’ mighty walls, at first the defenders easily beat back several attacks 
by the East Roman army, which leads to Belisarius losing many of his finest 
fighters. However, events shift dramatically back to Belisarius’ favour, when 
an Isaurian soldier in the Roman army stumbles upon a secret entrance into 
the city via the aqueduct, which Belisarius’ men had cut earlier in the siege. 
Preparing to launch his clandestine assault, Belisarius offers Stephanus 
one final chance to surrender Naples. This time Belisarius uses stick rather 
than carrot, warning Stephanus that their shared Roman and Christian 
identity would do the Neapolitans little good if the imperial army took 
the city by storm. The warning Procopius has Belisarius recite is ominous: 
πόλιν δὲ ἀρχαίαν καὶ οἰκήτορας Χριστιανούς τε καὶ Ῥωμαίους ἄνωθεν 
ἔχουσαν ἐς τοῦτο τύχης οὐκ ἂν εὐξαίμην, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ Ῥωμαίων 
στρατηγοῦντος, ἐλθεῖν, μάλιστα ἐπεὶ βάρβαροι πολλοί μοι τὸ πλῆθος ἐν 
36. Procopius, Wars 5.8. 34-35, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 44 (Stewart trans.).
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τῷ στρατοπέδῳ εἰσίν, ἀδελφοὺς ἢ ξυγγενεῖς πρὸ τοῦδε ἀπολωλεκότες 
τοῦ τείχους: ὧν δὴ κατέχειν τὸν θυμόν, ἢν πολέμῳ τὴν πόλιν ἕλωσιν, οὐκ 
ἂν δυναίμην.
(“I pray that an ancient city, which for ages has been inhabited by 
Christians and Romans, may not meet with such a fate, especially while 
I am commanding the Roman army, not least because my army contains 
many barbarians who have lost brothers or relatives before the wall of 
this city. I will be unable to restrain their wrath if they take the city in 
war”)37 Devastated, Stephanus returns to Naples and relates Belisarius’ 
threat; however, as Procopius records: οἱ δὲ (οὐδὲ γὰρ <χρ>ῆν Νεαπολίτας 
ἀθῴους βασιλεῖ κατηκόους γενέσθαι) οὔτε ἔδεισάν τι οὔτε Βελισαρίῳ 
προσχωρεῖν ἔγνωσαν (“But it was not fated that the Neapolitans become 
subject of the emperor scot-free, so they neither feared nor decided to yield 
to Belisarius”)38. Sneaking into the unsuspecting city via the aqueduct 
well on in the night, the East Romans caught the city’s defenders unaware 
shortly before dawn, and what followed –as many contemporary sources tell 
us– was a horrific slaughter of Gothic soldiers and both armed and unarmed 
civilians–whom Jordanes describes coldly as the Romanis rebellantibus 
(“Roman rebels”)39.
Even though he was there, we should not accept uncritically everything 
that Procopius tells us, though he probably did not stray too far from the 
basic truth. His highly literary speeches likely record far less accurately 
the actual negotiations between Belisarius, the Neapolitans, and the Goths, 
or relate the actual attitudes of either side towards Justinian’s ideological 
claims to sovereignty. So too might Procopius’ further detail concerning 
37. Procopius, Wars, 5.9. 27, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 49 (Stewart trans.).  
38. Procopius, Wars, 5.9. 30, ed. haury –wirth, v. 2, 50 (trans. in Prokopios, The wars 
of Justinian, transl. by H. B. dewing. Revised and modernized by A. KaLdeLLis, Indianapolis 
2014, 274).
39. Jordanes, Romana 370, ed. Th. M. MoMMsen, MGH, AA, 5/1, Berlin 1882 [repr. 
1961). This carnage is corroborated by Liber Pontificalis, Vita Severius 61.4: […] interfecit 
et Gothos et omnes cives Neapolitano; Marcellinus, Chron. s.a. 536.3. Procopius (Wars 5.10. 
30-7, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 55-56) on the, otherhand, downplays the carnage somewhat, on 
which see G. deL Mastro, Belisarius’ repopulation of Neapolis: Troccla in Landolfus Sagax’ 
Roman History, Naples: in Apolline Project Vol 1: Studies on Vesuvius’ North Slope & the 
Bay of Naples, ed. G. de siMone – r. MaCfarLane, Naples 2009, 254-262.
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the native Jewish population within Naples and its enthusiastic support of 
the Gothic cause, provoke our suspicions that we are being manipulated 
by Procopius to see the opposition in Naples as something other than 
“Roman”40. or, as he differentiates Jews from “barbarians,” perhaps he 
is subtly critiquing Justinian’s policy of persecution against religious 
minorities41. Justinian unquestionably enacted harsh measures against 
his Jewish population, whereas the Gothic sovereigns generally protected 
their Jewish communities42. As we will discuss in further detail below, the 
issues raised in these speeches concerning the complex web of identities and 
loyalties amongst the citizens of Naples in 536 prepares the reader for a 
further debate of these questions of identity and loyalty later in Wars, when 
Totila and the Goths turn the tables on the East Romans and besiege and 
then retake Naples seven years later.
Whatever the true circumstances of local resistance, this catastrophe 
proved to be the final straw for the Gothic “hardliners” within the army, 
who at Regata elected a new king, the dux [general] Vitigis,43 who had served 
previously as Theodahad’s spatharius [head bodyguard] and had been 
spearheading Gothic resistance to Belisarius’ advance, while Theodahad 
remained safely behind the walls of Rome. 
one could argue that Theodahad’s instinct to defend Rome was 
correct but, with the fall of Naples, he had lost the confidence of the Gothic 
warriors. He behaved like an emperor, sending his armies to do battle, but 
his troops wanted a traditional warrior king to lead them. Massimiliano 
Vitiello supposes that some physical impairment had prevented Theodahad 
from the “prerequisite” Gothic military education44. It seems more plausible 
that, as their hold on Italy grew more secure, a distinct minority of Gothic 
40. Procopius Wars, 5.8. 41, 5.10. 24-26, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 45, 53-54.
41. E.g., Procopius, Secret History, 11. 14-30,13. 7-8, 18. 34-35, ed. haury –wirth, 72-75.
42. For the tolerant attitudes of the Goths to minority religious groups in Italy, see 
arnoLd, Roman Imperial Restoration, 73. And for Justinian’s harsh measures towards the 
Jews, BjornLije, Politics and Tradition, 70.
43. Vitigis PLRE III: 1382-1386 [Vitigis]. Vitigis had earned his military reputation 
with an important victory over a combined Gepid and Herul army in 530 rather than in 504-
505, as Procopius suggests in Wars 5.11.5, on which see H. woLfraM, History of the Goths, 
trans. T. DunLap, Berkeley 1988, 340-341.
44. VitieLLo, Theodahad, 27-29.
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elites would have willingly abstained from military training. So too since 
the days of Theoderic, as part of their polyphonic ideology, the Gothic kings 
had draped themselves in Roman imperial virtues. As John Moorhead once 
commented, “The Romans could have been forgiven for seeing in Theoderic 
an emperor”45. Jonathan Arnold has recently gone further, stressing that 
Eastern sources served an imperial agenda by painting Theoderic “as a 
savage and heretical king”. Even Procopius’ sympathetic portrait (Wars 5.1. 
26-29), which recognised Theoderic’s civilised imperial qualities, still needed 
to depict him “as a sub-Roman ruler who had technically been a tyrant”. 
(Λόγῳ μὲν τύραννος, ἔργῳ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἀληθής). In his intriguing –yet 
controversial– interpretation, Arnold insists that from a Western perspective 
Theoderic “was a princeps Romanus, or Roman emperor, acknowledged as 
such by his own subjects and presented as such, though in a deferential and 
conciliatory manner to those in the East”46. How sincerely the Italo-Romans 
accepted such imperial rhetoric on behalf of the Goths is open to debate47.
Yet, it is clear that Theodahad was defined by contemporary sources as 
someone who desired to rule like a civilised Roman emperor, but who failed 
to display the martial qualities expected from a Gothic king48.
BETRAYALS
Upon hearing the news of the coup, Theodahad had escaped Rome with a 
small cadre of loyal followers, perhaps hoping to finally accept Justinian’s 
offer and flee to Constantinople49. However, optaris, a Goth bearing a 
grudge against Theodahad, caught and executed Theodahad a few miles 
short of Ravenna. Meanwhile, Vitigis had retreated to the safety of Rome50. 
45. Moorhead, Justinian, 188. 
46. J. arnoLd, Theoderic and the Roman Imperial Restoration, Cambridge 2014, 72, 90. 
47. This thorny question is addressed by M. deVeCKa, White Elephant Gifts: Classicism 
in ostrogothic Policy and in Variae 10.3, JLA 9.1 (2016), 195-217.
48. M.E. stewart, Contests of Andreia in Procopius’ Gothic Wars, Παρεκβολαὶ 4, 
21–54, here, 26-35.
49. VitieLLo, Theodahad, 155, makes the plausible, yet unsubstantiated suggestion, that 
Justinian’s legates, Peter and Athanasius –whom Theodahad had had arrested in the previous 
summer– were in his party as well.
50. Procopius, Wars, 5.11. 10-11, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 60, Jordanes, Getica, 310, 
Romana, 372, Marcellinus, Chron., s.a. 536.
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Procopius’ account of Vitigis’ short sojourn in Rome centres on the 
Gothic king’s vain appeal for those in the city to remain loyal to the Gothic 
cause: μετὰ δὲ Σιλβερίῳ τε τῷ τῆς πόλεως ἱερεῖ καὶ Ῥωμαίων τοῖς τε ἐκ 
βουλῆς καὶ τῷ δήμῳ πολλὰ παραινέσας Οὐίττιγις, καὶ τῆς Θευδερίχου 
ἀρχῆς ὑπομνήσας, ἐνεκελεύετο ἅπασιν ἐς Γότθων τὸ ἔθνος εὐνοϊκῶς 
ἔχειν, ὅρκοις αὐτοὺς δεινοτάτοις ὑπὲρ τούτων καταλαβών, ἄνδρας τε 
ἀπολέξας. (“After this Vitigis exhorted at length Pope Silverius (536-537) 
the senate and the people of the Romans, reminding them of the rule of 
Theoderic, and he urged them all to be loyal to the nation of Goths, binding 
them by the most solemn oaths to do so”)51. Vitigis then selected a garrison 
of four thousand to stay behind to protect Rome. Shortly after giving this 
speech –with a large number of aristocratic Italo-Roman hostages in tow– 
Vitigis abandoned Rome for Ravenna, where he began rallying a segment 
of the Gothic nobility that was viscerally opposed to the rule of Italy from 
Constantinople. Nothing went according to plan for the Gothic king; each 
of the groups that Vitigis appealed to in Rome went on to betray him. It is 
likely that Procopius expected his readers to detect the folly of the Gothic 
king in believing that master/servant relationships would trump the long 
ties of shared Romanitas amongst the East Romans and the Italians. So too 
did he underestimate the Gothic garrison’s willingness to die for his cause. 
A few days later (Wars 5.14. 4-5) Belisarius received assurances from papal 
legates that Rome would open its gates to him, and, at the same time, the 
East Roman general had been negotiating with the Gothic garrison in Rome 
as well (Wars 5.14. 12-13). We would further suggest that this and other 
discussions of their shifting allegiances by Procopius, moreover, served to 
underline for the East Roman readership the Italo-Romans’ and Goths’ 
fickle natures and hence the dangers of trusting either. 
In fact, Belisarius later deposed Silverius (Wars 5.25.13) for allegedly 
colluding with the Goths. In Secret History, Procopius implicates Belisarius’ 
wife, Antonina, and the empress Theodora in Silverius’ dismissal and 
subsequent death. The Liber Pontificalis relates a vivid scene in Rome from 
537 where Antonina has Pope Silverius deposed after giving him a tongue 
lashing while Belisarius sits by. Another source, Liberatus, attempts to 
51. Procopius, Wars, 5.11. 26, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 62 (trans. dewing [modified], 
115).
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exonerate Silverius, insisting that a letter which the pope had purportedly 
written to the Goths during Vitigis’ siege of Rome in 537 was a forgery52.
Figure 2: The Goths assemble at Regata (Forum Appii) and then retreat to Rome, along 
the Via Appia, under Vitigis. The East Roman army is led, along the Via Latina to 
Rome, from Naples by Belisarius (©Lillington-Martin).
So, unopposed on 9 December 536, Belisarius captured Rome from the 
Goths53. As the East Roman army, through a prearranged agreement, 
marched triumphantly through the Asinarian Gate located to the southeast 
of the city, in the northwest the 4,000 soldiers of the Gothic garrison fled 
through the Flaminian Gate to Ravenna. Belisarius then ordered Leuderis 
to deliver the keys to Rome’s gates to Justinian in Constantinople54. That 
Procopius expected his readers to see the Gothic garrisons’ evacuation and 
Leuderis’ surrender as yet another betrayal, is confirmed by the earlier 
52. Cf. Procopius, Secret History, 1.14,26, ed. haury – wirth, 8, 10; Liber Pontificalis 
(Vita Silverius 60.8) and Liberatus, Breviarum 22, ed. E. sChwartz: in Acta Conciliorum 
Oecumenicorum 2/5, Berlin 1936, 98-141.
53. Liber Pontificalis, (Vita Silverius 60.4) assigns it to 10 December. 
54. Procopius, Wars, 5.14. 14, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 77.
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speech he has Vitigis give in Rome, in which the Gothic king reassures his 
audience that Leuderis and the 4,000 man garrison would be more than 
enough to protect Rome from Belisarius’ advancing army55.
Assisted once more by the failure of yet another Gothic army to stand 
and fight, Belisarius had triumphed again. Yet a reader of the Wars soon 
discovers that the above declaration by Procopius was a tease: although 
Rome had fallen, the real fighting between the Goths and the East Romans 
had just begun. What appeared initially to be the relatively rapid collapse 
of Gothic power in Italy quickly proved illusory. 
 Belisarius’ capture of Rome, in fact, appears to have stiffened some 
of the Goths’ resolve to resist. According to Procopius, part of the reason 
for the Goths’ reluctance to yield was Justinian’s policy –as we saw in the 
example of Ebremud– to deport Goths “to Byzantion” and make them “settle 
there”56. This reluctance to depart Italy on the part of the Goths should 
not be too surprising, since most had been born in Italy and developed 
social bonds with their local communities57. As Guy Halsall remarks, “It 
would be yet more mistaken to see the soldiers facing Belisarius’ troops, 
let alone those who confronted Narses, as shaped by anything other than 
late antique Italian, Provençal or Dalmatian culture”. So, considering this 
generational blurring of “familial and genealogical distinctions”,58 perhaps 
we should see the “stubborn” two decades of Gothic resistance as a form 
of dissidence against Justinian’s draconian resettlement measures and his 
court’s ideological propaganda that sought to create a sharp oppositional 
division between two well-defined groups: Goths—and those perceived in 
Procopius and other contemporary writers to be “native” Italians and/or 
Romans of old. 
of course, the East Romans had some practical and legitimate reasons 
for removing former enemy combatants from what was still an active front. 
The Goths deported from Italy were being treated in a similar manner 
to other foreign units. In Justinian’s military it was common practice to 
55. Procopius, Wars, 5.11. 25, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 61.
56. Procopius, Wars, 6.29. 17, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 284-285 (trans. Dewing).
57. AMory, People and Identity, 1997, 170-171.
58. haLsaLL, ostrogothic Army, 193-194. other scholars argue for less integration 
amongst Goths and Italians, e.g., B. swain, Goths and Gothic Identity in the ostrogothic 
Kingdom: in arnoLd et al. [as in n. 15], 203-233. 
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assign soldiers or units that had either deserted willingly or been defeated 
in battle to foreign postings to cut down on betrayals or defections59. For 
instance Vandal, and later, Gothic PoWs, were assigned to the Persian 
campaigns60, while we find Persian PoWs in Italy.61 Moors also served 
within the Roman army in Italy62, as allies like the Heruls and the Huns 
fighting in North Africa and Italy. Yet removing Roman allies, like the 
Huns from their homeland could lead to increased defections and in some 
instances betrayal in the lead up to battle, such as when the Huns nearly 
betrayed Belisarius at the battle of Tricamarum in 53363, or the uprising 
by the Vandal cavalry unit in North Africa in 536 discussed above.
QUAGMIRE
Likely knowing that he needed to drive Belisarius and his small army out of 
Rome before reinforcements and resupplies from Constantinople could arrive, 
Vitigis either left Ravenna or arrived outside of Rome with a significant 
army in late February 53764. The speed and scale of Vitigis’ counter-attack 
seems to have caught even the usually well-prepared Belisarius off guard. 
From Procopius’ perspective, the Romans had held the upper hand in these 
initial skirmishes, but the Goths’ sheer numbers overwhelmed them and 
Belisarius. It is during this time that we see a shift, in which soldiers from 
the East Roman army begin deserting to the Gothic side.
Vitigis’ part-encirclement of Rome was greatly aided by deserters from 
Belisarius’ army who abandoned the guard tower at the Salarian Bridge65. 
Procopius observed: ἦλθον δὲ αὐτοῖς αὐτόμολοι δύο καὶ εἴκοσι, βάρβαροι 
μὲν γένος, στρατιῶται δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι, ἐκ καταλόγου ἱππικοῦ οὗπερ 
Ἰννοκέντιος ἦρχεν (“But twenty-two deserters came to them [the Goths], 
59. parneLL, Justinian’s Men, 78.
60. Vandals (Wars 4.14.17-18) and Goths (2.18.24-25) [ed. haury – wirth, v. 1, 484, 231].
61. Persians (Wars 2.19. 24-25 and 7.3. 11, ed. haury – wirth, v. 1, 235 and v. 2, 310).
62. Moors (Wars 5.5. 4, 5.25. 9, 6.23. 36-9; 7.18. 26-8, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 25, 124, 
256-257, 377-378).
63. Procopius, Wars, 4.1. 5-7, 4. 37, ed. haury – wirth, v. 1, 419- 420.
64. Liber Pontificalis, Vita Silverius 60.4.
65. C. LiLLington-Martin, Procopius on the struggle for Dara and Rome: in: War and 
Warfare in Late Antiquity: Current Perspectives, ed. A sarantis – n. Christie, Leiden 2013, 
599-630, here 616-619.
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men who were barbarians by race, but Roman soldiers, from the cavalry 
units of Innocentius”)66. Here, Procopius clarifies that the Roman soldiers 
who deserted were barbarians, as was often the case. This might give us 
confidence that when he says a “Roman” soldier deserts he specifically 
means a Roman, though of course we cannot be certain that he did this 
consistently. 
Despite an auspicious start, Vitigis proved to be only nominally a more 
successful leader than Theodahad. His return to Rome led to an unsuccessful 
year-long siege. In 538 he retreated to Ravenna and, after two more years 
of war, he abdicated in 540 in favour of Belisarius. So Vitigis effectively 
defected, and Belisarius’ scheme bordered on treachery towards Justinian, 
as he had no authority to accept the Gothic throne. Yet, in one of the most 
famous double-crosses from Late Antiquity, Procopius reveals this was just 
subterfuge on Belisarius’ part67. Belisarius refused to double-cross Justinian, 
and instead used his acceptance of the throne as a ruse to capture Vitigis 
and Ravenna. Even after Vitigis’ submission, the Goths continued to send 
envoys to the obstinate Belisarius, promising that if he accepted their offer, 
they would recognize καὶ βασιλέα Βελισάριον Γότθων τε καὶ Ἰταλιωτῶν 
(“Belisarius as emperor of the Goths and Italians”)68. Belisarius, however, 
still refused to betray Justinian. Instead, he took Vitigis to Constantinople, 
where Justinian rewarded the former Gothic king with a luxurious, albeit 
short-lived, retirement (he died in 542).
The year 540 was a significant turning point in Justinian’s reconquest 
of Italy. The close of Book 6 lays the foundation for Totila’s rise in Book 7 
and the decline of the East Romans’ fortunes. Procopius spends much of 
the first half of Book 7 discussing how Totila’s adept and moral leadership 
had quickly reinvigorated the Gothic army’s fighting spirit. Conversely, on 
the Roman side, a lack of support from the central government, combined 
with protracted internal conflicts and what Procopius describes as the 
66. Procopius, Wars, 5.17.17, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 89.
67. heather, Rome Resurgent, 178-179 is only one of the most recent to discuss 
Belisarius’ rejection of the offer. For a full treatment of the topic, see C. LiLLington-Martin, 
Procopius, Belisarius and the Goths. Journal of the Oxford University History Society: Odd 
Alliances, ed. by H. eLLis – g. igLesias rogers (2009), 1-17.
68. Procopius, Wars 6 .30.26, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 293 (trans. Dewing). In a sixth-
century context βασιλεύς could simply mean “king”.
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moral decline of the Roman high command undermines the morale of the 
entire Roman army, which led to a rapid rollback of many of the Roman 
gains achieved under Belisarius. Now that the tide had turned in the Goths’ 
favour, so too do we see a steady wave of desertions from the Roman side to 
the Goths. We should not find this too surprising since, as Patrick Amory 
explains, “Defections, of course, also followed the success of an army, and 
now Totila’s army was in assent”69.
SECoND SIEGE oF NAPLES
In Procopius’ vision of 540s Italy, momentum shifted in the Goths’ favour 
as, on the one hand, the East Roman generals and administration succumb 
to jealousy, avarice, bickering, and injustice, while, on the other hand, the 
Goths –ruled with an iron fist by Totila– unite and treat the Italo-Romans 
and defeated East Roman enemy with a firm but fair adherence to justice 
and honour70.
Totila’s siege of Naples in 542-543 offered Procopius a further oppor-
tunity to probe these subjects. Here, a mere seven years after the city had 
fallen to Belisarius, what Procopius described as Totila’s proper moral 
conduct and ability to correctly balance sternness and magnanimity leads 
to the Goths’ recapture of Naples and the surrender of its 1,000-strong East 
Roman garrison commanded by the general Konon, the commander we met 
at the opening of this article. Like Belisarius before him, to achieve his 
goal Totila wields both stick and carrot. To intimidate the Roman garrison, 
he mutilates a Roman captive who had insulted him and then displays 
the victim to the Roman soldiers (mainly Isaurians) manning the walls–
somewhat ironic, given that it was an Isaurian soldier who had discovered 
the passage into the city during Belisarius’ siege in 536. As Totila and his 
army slowly starve the city into submission, Procopius crafts a set speech, 
in which, recalling their loyalty at the first siege of Naples, the Gothic king 
addresses the citizens of Naples in a friendly manner as a political tactic: 
Μετὰ δὲ καὶ Τουτίλας αὐτοὺς ξυγκαλέσας ἐς τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἔλεξε τοιάδε: 
‘Οὐδεμίαν αἰτίαν ἢ μέμψιν ἐς ὑμᾶς ἔχοντες, ἄνδρες Νεαπολῖται, τανῦν ἐς 
69. aMory, People and Identity, 177.
70. M. stewart, Masculinity, Identity, and Power Politics in the Age of Justinian: A 
Study of Procopius, Amsterdam 2020, 93-196.
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πολιορκίαν τήνδε κατέστημεν, ἀλλ ὅπως ἐχθίστων ὑμᾶς ἀπαλλάξαντες 
δεσποτῶν οἷοί τε ὦμεν τάς τε χάριτας ὑμῖν ἐκτιννύναι, ὧνπερ ἡμᾶς 
δεδρακότες ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ τὰ χαλεπώτατα πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων 
πεπόνθατε’.
(“Men of Naples, it is not because we have any accusation or reproach 
to bring against you that we have undertaken this siege, but so we may be 
able, by freeing you from most hated masters, to repay you for the service 
you have done during this war, due to which you have been treated with the 
utmost severity by the enemy”)71.
Procopius here links the debates concerning freedom/slavery and loyalty/ 
honour begun in his account of the first siege of Naples to this second siege 
in 543. While Belisarius in 536 sought to rescue them from the “yoke” of 
the Goths, here the “hated masters” are the East Romans. The Neapolitans 
had paid the price for their loyalty to the Goths and refusal to surrender to 
Belisarius. As with many of his “true” views, Procopius’ personal attitude 
to the Neapolitans’ dire situation is open to interpretation. on one level, it 
could be argued that Procopius strove to show his contemporary readers that 
the Neapolitans’ stubborn refusal to submit to Belisarius’ original offer to 
surrender directly contributed to their present plight. Interpreted on another 
level, however, it might reflect the historian’s growing disenchantment 
with the miserable state of Justinian’s Western campaigns at the time he 
published the first seven Books of the Wars, around 55072. Lastly, it may be 
a commentary on the servility of the Italo-Romans who were torn between 
two martial peoples: the Goths and the Romans from Constantinople73. only 
by looking at the bigger picture and following the threads of the depictions 
of the two sieges seven years apart from beginning to end can the reader 
absorb the lessons that Procopius sought to impart. Though the Roman 
soldiers tried to hold out, hunger gets the better of them and they open 
the gates to Totila and his Goths. The parallels to the first siege continue 
when Totila’s compassionate behaviour– depicted by Procopius as an astute 
71. Procopius, Wars, 7.7. 11, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 326-327 (trans. in Prokopios, the 
Wars of Justinian [as in n. 38], 395).
72. on the difficulty of pinning down Procopius’ “true” views, see P. Van nuffeLen, 
The Wor(l)ds of Procopius: in LiLLington-Martin and turquois [as in n. 17], 40-55.
73. stewart, Danger of the Soft Life.
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political tactic– in this peaceful second “sack” cannot help but bring to 
the reader’s mind the devastation Belisarius wrought when his army took 
the city. In contrast to events in 536, in the words of Procopius: Ἐπειδὴ 
δὲ Νεάπολιν Τουτίλας εἷλε, φιλανθρωπίαν ἐς τοὺς ἡλωκότας ἐπεδείξατο 
οὔτε πολεμίῳ οὔτε βαρβάρῳ ἀνδρὶ πρέπουσαν. (“once Naples fell to 
Totila, he showed kindness to his captives that was to be expected neither 
from an enemy nor a barbarian”)74. His first step was to assuage the hunger 
of the besieged. Fearing that the starving Roman captives might die by 
overindulgence, Totila only gradually increased their rations to help them 
slowly restore their strength. Rather more surprising to Procopius, Totila 
gives the Roman commander Konon and his soldiers the choice to join his 
side or peacefully return to Roman held territory–Totila even provides them 
with money and supplies for their journey. Totila’s ability to pay his soldiers 
and his humane conduct caused many Roman soldiers to switch sides, which 
tellingly drew no criticism from Procopius75.
In sharp contrast to his discussion of Totila’s munificence, Procopius 
condemns the Roman high command for its immoral sexual conduct and 
plunder of the Italo-Romans’ lands76. Konon is one of the misbehaving 
generals. Procopius accuses him of hoarding grain and then profiting from 
its sale to Rome’s starving citizens77. Procopius connects Justinian’s failure 
to pay the Roman soldiers to a string of failures against Totila’s Goths in the 
540s. Clearly blaming Justinian, Procopius lamented in his Secret History: 
ὥστε πάντων τοὺς στρατιώτας ἅτε τρόποις ἐκνενευρισμένους πολλοῖς 
πτωχοτέρους τε γεγονέναι καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν προθυμεῖσθαι 
ξυνέβη (“that soldiers were demoralised in so many ways, became poorer 
than other classes, and no longer cared for fighting in war”)78. What could 
they be expected to do under such dire conditions? Ultimately, as we saw in 
our opening, the commander’s rapacious behaviour leads the desperate East 
Roman soldiers to murder Konon. Episodes like this and others concerning 
desertion in the Wars functioned to remind those from the political and 
74. Procopius, Wars, 7.8.1, ed. haury – wirth, v. 2, 326 (trans. in Prokopios the Wars of 
Justinian [as in n. 38], 396).
75. parneLL, Justinian’s Men, 177.
76. Procopius, Wars, 7.9. 1, ed. haury – wirth, V. 2, 332-333].
77. Procopius, Wars, 7.17. 10, ed. haury – wirth, V. 2, 371.
78. Procopius, Secret History, 24.8, ed. haury – wirth, 147. Cf. Wars, 7.12. 7-8.
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military elite from Constantinople –who were the Wars’ primary audience– 
that soldiers must be properly paid, fed, and led or they could be expected 
to desert to the enemy. Moreover, joining Totila’s army was not largely an 
“ethnic” but a political choice for these deserters from the East Roman 
army. Unquestionably, the Gothic and, especially, the East Roman armies 
were made up of soldiers from diverse ethnic backgrounds. Tellingly, near 
the close of the Wars (8.28.2), Procopius has a Gothic commander describe 
Narses’ army as a “heterogeneous horde of barbarians” (βαρβάρων δὲ 
παμμίκτῳ ὁμίλῳ). 
In certain circumstances, soldiers and civilians could switch sides 
without facing wider social recrimination. As we saw with the example of 
Meligedios and Ulifus, Procopius differentiated between what he interpreted 
as cases of honourable and dishonourable desertion. It is these subtle nuances 
in degrees of desertion that led one down the road to treason or else a return 
to honour. By paying close attention to the lessons Procopius imparts, we 
can see that the Roman garrisons’ murder of Konon and subsequent threat 
to desert to the Goths, were likely not seen by Procopius –and one suspects 
most of his contemporary readers– as treasonous, but as justifiable acts of 
dissidence by soldiers, whose loyalty could be wielded both as a commodity 
and a weapon, even against an emperor as powerful as Justinian.
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αλλαζοντας Παραταξεις ςτους Γοτθικους Πολεμους του ΠροκοΠιου
Η αφήγηση του ιστοριογράφου Προκoπίου για τον πόλεμο εναντίον 
των Γότθων στην Ιταλία περιέχει πολλές περιπτώσεις Γότθων, Ιταλών και 
Ανατολικών Ρωμαίων που αλλάζουν παρατάξεις κατά τη διάρκεια της 
μακράς σύγκρουσης. Η συστηματική εξέταση του θέματος δείχνει ότι ο 
Προκόπιος γενικά αντιμετώπιζε με συγκατάβαση τους στρατιώτες που 
λιποτακτούσαν, στάση, που αντικατοπτρίζει τις ευρύτερες μεσογειακές 
αντιλήψεις του 6ου αιώνα. Τί μπορούν να μας διδάξουν τα παραδείγματα 
των «προδοτικών» συμπεριφορών σχετικά με τη διαφωνία στην 
εποχή του Ιουστινιανού; Παρόμοιες και άλλες πράξεις διαφωνίας από 
στρατιώτες υποδηλώνουν ότι μονάδες του στρατού του Ιουστινιανού 
–τουλάχιστον κατά τη διάρκεια του δυτικού πολέμου– είχαν κάποιο 
επίπεδο ελευθερίας του λόγου και της δράσης, που μερικές φορές τους 
επέτρεπε να υπαγορεύουν όρους είτε στον διοικητή τους είτε στην 
κεντρική κυβέρνηση στην Κωνσταντινούπολη. Με τον ίδιο τρόπο και η 
γοτθική αντίσταση στην Ιταλία, μπορεί να ερμηνευθεί ως μια πράξη μη 
συμμόρφωσης προς την πολιτική που τους αντιμετώπιζε  ως βαρβάρους, 
χωρίς νόμιμη αξίωση για την Ιταλία.
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